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THE FIXATION ON BELIEF
An Article Review Paper of
"The Fixation of Belief"
by Charles Sanders Pierce
by Brett Clippingdale
In "The Fixation of Belief," Charles Sanders Pierce
argues that the method of science is superior to all other methods, due
to its ability to establish what is true and what is not true in an
objective manner. He argues that since “experience of the
method has not led us to doubt it,” the method of science
will necessarily lead us to “one true conclusion.”
Reinforced by the astounding fruits of science, these arguments made by
Pierce in 1877 (and by many of his pragmatist contemporaries) are
powerful enough to persist in the 21st century, in particular as the
subtext for the common faith in science as society’s
salvation. It is the object of this paper to challenge not only the
scientific method, but also the fixation on belief
itself, whether subjective or objective, which drives
Pierce’s essay.
Pierce begins with an appeal to logic to determine what is true, rather
than the “pleasing and encouraging visions” which
might occasion “a fallacious tendency of thought.”
His key point is that in the implementation of logic, the
“irritation of doubt” is so uncomfortable that it
“causes a struggle to attain a state of belief.”
Analyzing the common mind, Pierce writes that this struggle has as its
sole object “the settlement of opinion” about a
fact rather than knowing the truth of the fact itself; he reminds us
that a “true conclusion would remain true if we had no
impulse to accept it.” Pierce next provides a powerful
analysis of the various methods of fixing belief.
Describing belief to be “of the nature of a habit”,
Pierce dismisses what he calls the method of tenacity, noting that many
humans prefer contentment to truth and will avoid doubt once they have
settled upon a comforting belief; thus, habitual belief is subject to
logical fallacy. Pierce writes optimistically, however, that
“the social impulse is against” the survival of
this method – since each individual in society is confronted
with the ideas of other individuals, each will allow that
others’ opposing ideas may be more valid.
Pierce enlists the theories of his fashionable contemporary, Darwin, to
prove that the survival of the human species depends upon this
competition of ideas, and further advances that survival demands we
find a method of fixing belief suitable not only to the individual, but
to the community. He notes, however, that government (and other social
institutions) ultimately mandates truth according to its own interests
rather than to the integrity of logic; thus this approach, which he
calls the method of authority, inevitably leads to its own logical
fallacies.
Pierce then examines the a priori method, which he
defines as thinking “as one is inclined to think,”
with propositions “agreeable to reason”. He writes
that although “this method is far more intellectual and
respectable from the point of view of reason than either of the others
… its failure has been the most manifest,” noting
examples where sentiment has developed arbitrarily and inconsistently,
and so its logic is undependable.
Having dismissed these methods of fixing belief, Pierce makes his case
for the method of science. Since our opinion of the truth does not
change whether it is true or not, he argues that “a method
should be found by which our beliefs may be caused by nothing human,
but by some external permanency – by something upon which our
thinking has no effect.” Pierce writes that the scientific
method presumes that “realities affect our senses according
to regular laws, and, though our sensations are as different as our
relations to the objects, yet, by taking advantage of the laws of
perception, we can ascertain by reasoning how things really are, and
any man … will be led to the one true conclusion.”
He writes that the scientific method is valid because
“experience of the method has not led us to doubt
it.”
Unfortunately, Pierce does not critically analyze and probe his
arguments for the method of science as thoroughly and powerfully as he
does for the other methods. For example, modern experience with the
scientific method leaves us with great doubts regarding its
infallibility. Since Pierce did not have the benefit of modern science
when he wrote, it might seem excusable that he failed to consider
alternate approaches to the method; however, he is at least guilty of
failing to use the method itself in his analysis of it. More
importantly, he did have the benefit of 19th century scientific
history, which told him that one scientific idea after another had
fallen down, disproved by the scientific method itself. Copernicus
disproved Ptolemy, showing that the sun does not orbit the earth.
Newton, too, advanced several theories which turned the scientific
world on its head.
In the 20th century, the scientific method gave us quantum physics,
which predicts that any object may behave in a manner entirely
inconsistent with previously observed patterns – speaking
metaphorically: one of these days, when you drop a ball it’s
going to go up instead of down. Thus, the scientific method leads us to
more than “one true conclusion.” While some might
argue that this only proves that the scientific method accounts for all
possibilities of reality, in fact it points to its fundamental problem:
the method can only understand what it can measure. Any object that
behaves according to chance, rather than measurable rules, evades the
“regular laws” necessary for the method.
Further, according to the actual practice of the scientific method, any
object that is not measurable does not exist. Gravity did not exist
until it was measured, nor did black holes, nor was the universe
thought to be expanding. Until the past decade, when biologists in
Oregon measured their low frequency communications, scientists laughed
at the idea that trees could talk. Quantum phenomena, which have been
observed but continue to elude understanding, did not exist even
according to a scientist as great as Albert Einstein, who said
“God does not play dice with the universe.” Though
Einstein eventually recanted, there are likely whole realms of
existence unknown to scientists, or anyone else for that matter,
because these realities may not “affect our
senses.” Since Pierce argues that a “true
conclusion would remain true if we had no impulse to accept
it,” he would have to accept the possibility that
“how things really are” may be beyond the reach of
the method of science.
Nor is it true that less leading-edge science will lead to
“one true conclusion.” While most of us believe
man-made pollutants cause acid rain, in the 1980’s Ronald
Reagan cited studies made by a few scientists who seriously claimed
acid rain came from bumble bees. Even today, some scientists believe
man-made pollutants are to blame for the hole in the ozone layer, while
others claim it is a natural, cyclical phenomenon. Many physicists
today believe in the superstring theory, while others scoff at it, just
as some continue to doubt mounting scientific evidence that the speed
of light is not constant. What this tells us is that the scientific
method is vulnerable to subjective and arbitrary tendencies, just as
with the a priori method; therefore, it is
undependable in the quest to find “one true
conclusion.”
Pierce’s argument that “by taking advantage of the
laws of perception, we can ascertain by reasoning how things really
are” demands deeper analysis. Since he argues our perception
is based on our senses, the wholeness of any reality may or may not
elude us, and so we can only infer how they affect what we are aware
of, either through measurement or reflection. Thus, the “one
true conclusion,” not being whole, may not be true, either.
Clearly the scientific method is of great use, especially in the
healing arts, such as the fields of medicine and environmental science.
But that it is so useful does not make it absolute, does not give any
final conclusions about our existence, whether in science or as it is
applied to questions of ethics, metaphysics or any other branch of
philosophy. It is important to remember that our very conceptions and
approach to all our methods of understanding fail Pierce’s
demand for “something upon which our thinking has no
effect,” since the conception itself is a product of our
thinking. A world-view that separates subject from object ignores that
the cosmos may well be more than the sum of its parts. This sort of
world-view attempts to frame and define an infinite cosmos within the
limits of our own meager capacity for understanding. We are but a small
part of an infinitely larger whole, and our small minds cannot possibly
grasp its entirety.
Pierce’s essay is rooted in the idea that doubt is an
irritant, and this irritant drives human inquiry. In my experience, I
have found that doubt is an irritant primarily for those whose thought
is dominated by the influence of European thinkers. Great as that
tradition may be, there are many cultures in the world that do not
share this need to be in control. Doubt is only irritating to those who
demand to know, who are impatient with the cosmos, who demand to be in
control of a world that lacks reins. Pierce invokes the feeling of
dissatisfaction as the cause for examination of two opposed or
“repugnant” (to each other) ideas; contrarily, I
think it is a limitation of the “western” mind that
we cannot hold two paradoxical ideas simultaneously to be true,
consistent within their own realms or contexts.
In the face of mystery, Europeans tend to ask
“why?” and feel entitled to know the answer;
certain other cultures, holding mystery to be beautiful and powerful,
say … well, not being European, they may not use words in
their celebration of the mystery of the cosmos. I believe it is
European culture’s fixation on belief, its obsession with
having a world-view that is purely logical (according to our own small
and limited minds), with having control over a cosmos, with having a
creator that must answer to us, that drives so many of us to
exasperation with the world as it is, or rather as it seems to us. I
believe the creator is always speaking to us, and we have much to learn
about our existence if we only take time to listen, to learn how to
listen (with more than just our ears), and then give up control to the
great and infinite mystery that is our cosmos. Was it not Bertrand
Russell who encouraged us to embrace the unknown?
ANALYSIS
“The Fixation of Belief” by Charles Sander Pierce:
I. Doubt is an irritant which causes a struggle to attain belief
II. Settlement of opinion is the sole object of the struggle to attain
belief
III. There are 4 methods of belief:
a. Method of Tenacity – stubborn refusal to entertain other
ideas fails to examine truth dispassionately and instead arbitrarily
chooses a comforting belief.
b. Method of Authority – government decides truth according
to its interests, not according to merit.
c. Method of a priori – development of sentiment arbitrary
and subject to logical error.
d. Method of Science – realities independent of our opinions
yet affect our senses, so laws of perception allow us to ascertain
reality as it actually is. Experience of the method has not led us to
doubt it.
Reasons in my challenge:
I. Scientific method not infallible – historical examples
given.
II. Quantum physics – impossibility of “one true
answer.”
III. Science understands only what can be measured.
IV. Different scientists may reach different conclusions – no
“one true conclusion.”
V. Scientific results unreliable, vulnerable to subjective approaches.
VI. Science cannot measure whole, therefore truth is not necessarily
revealed in full. Human mind smaller than cosmos, unable to fully
comprehend or frame it. Subject-object dichotomy denies that the cosmos
may be more than the sum of its parts.
VII. Doubt is only an irritant in the European tradition.
VIII. Mystery as a form of knowing.
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